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Abstract—We consider the framework of the McEliece cryp-
tosystem based on low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes, which
is a promising post-quantum alternative to classical public key
cryptosystems. The use of LDPC codes in this context allows to
achieve good security levels with very compact keys, which is an
important advantage over the classical McEliece cryptosystem
based on Goppa codes. However, only regular LDPC codes have
been considered up to now, while some further improvement can
be achieved by using irregular LDPC codes, which are known to
achieve better error correction performance than regular LDPC
codes. This is shown in this paper, for the first time at our
knowledge. The possible use of irregular transformation matrices
is also investigated, which further increases the efficiency of the
system, especially in regard to the public key size.
Index Terms—McEliece cryptosystem, irregular LDPC codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
A renewed interest is being devoted to code-based cryp-
tosystems, since they are recognized to be able to resist attacks
based on quantum computers, which will seriously endanger
widespread solutions, like the Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (RSA)
system, based on the integer factorization problem. The best
known code-based public key cryptosystem is the McEliece
cryptosystem [1], which relies on the problem of decoding
a random linear block code with no visible structure. This
system, in its original formulation, has never encountered any
polynomial time attack, and is able to guarantee very fast
encryption and decryption procedures. Its major drawbacks
are the encryption rate, which is smaller than 1, and, most of
all, the large size of its public keys.
In fact, the original solution adopts Goppa codes, which are
able to ensure very high security levels, but require the public
matrices to be unstructured. Hence, their storage needs a great
amount of memory. The most recent proposals concerning
Goppa codes provide updated choices of the system param-
eters to reduce the public key size and increase the security
level [2]. Despite this, the public key size is still very large: the
parameters proposed in [2] to achieve 128-bit security yield a
public key size of 1, 537, 536 bits.
Replacing Goppa codes with structured codes allows achiev-
ing considerable reductions in the key size, though security
issues must be taken into account. Recently, several proposals
based on quasi-cyclic low-density parity-check (QC-LDPC)
codes have appeared [3]–[7], showing that these codes are
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actually a promising alternative to traditional Goppa codes.
LDPC codes are capacity achieving codes [8] defined through
sparse parity-check matrices. They are employed in several
frameworks [9]–[11], and also used in some security-related
contexts [12]. Their use in the McEliece cryptosystem has been
studied since several years [13]–[15], and some refinements
have been progressively introduced to eventually achieve a
secure instance of the system. The use of structured LDPC
codes, like QC-LDPC codes, allows to considerably reduce
the key size, though renouncing the sparse character of the
public matrices.
Up to now only regular QC-LDPC codes have been con-
sidered for the use in this context, while it is well known
that irregular LDPC codes can achieve better error correcting
performance than regular codes [16]. In this paper, we show
that such feature allows to further reduce the public key
size. Another contribution to the same goal comes from the
adoption of irregular transformation matrices.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we recall
the QC-LDPC-code based McEliece cryptosystem; in Section
III, we define irregular QC-LDPC codes to be used in this
context, and assess their performance through simulations; in
Section IV, we provide a theoretical tool for estimating the
error correction capability of irregular codes; in Section V,
we assess the security level of the system; in Section VI, we
show the advantage achieved by irregular codes in terms of key
size through some examples; finally, Section VII concludes the
paper.
II. QC-LDPC CODE-BASED MCELIECE CRYPTOSYSTEM
The McEliece cryptosystem based on QC-LDPC codes
uses codes with length n = n0 · p, dimension k = k0 · p
and redundancy r = p, where n0 is a small integer (e.g.,
n0 = 2, 3, 4), k0 = n0 − 1, and p is a large integer (on the
order of some thousands or more). It follows that the code rate
is n0−1
n0
, which coincides with the encryption rate. Differently
from other solutions, like RSA, the McEliece cryptosystem
has encryption rate < 1, which yields some overhead in the
ciphertext, due to the code redundancy. While the original
McEliece cryptosystem used codes with rate about 1/2, its
most recent variants are focused on code rates on the order
of 0.7. Concerning the QC-LDPC code-based variant, we
consider the choice n0 = 4, that is, an encryption rate equal
to 3/4, which is in line with the most recent proposals.
In the QC-LDPC code-based McEliece cryptosystem, the
main component of the private key is a QC-LDPC matrix
having the following form [4], [17]:
H = [H0|H1| . . . |Hn0−1] , (1)
where each Hi is a circulant matrix with size p× p.
In all previous proposals, the matrix H as in (1) was regular,
that is, with constant column weight dv and constant row
weight dc = n0dv . In this work, we analyze a more general
form of H by considering non-constant column weights.
However, differently from completely general irregular LDPC
codes, we must preserve the quasi-cyclic (QC) nature of the
codes, since it provides important advantages in terms of the
public key size.
Hence, we consider a private QC-LDPC matrix which
still has the form (1), but formed by n0 circulant blocks
with different column weights:
{
d
(0)
v , d
(1)
v , d
(2)
v , . . . , d
(n0−1)
v
}
.
Now, dv has the meaning of average column weight, i.e.,
dv =
∑n0−1
i=0 d
(i)
v /n0, and the row weight is still constant
and equal to dc = n0dv .
Other two matrices are needed to form the private key: a
k× k non singular random scrambling matrix S and an n×n
non singular sparse transformation matrix Q. In the previous
versions of the QC-LDPC code-based McEliece cryptosystem
[3], [4], also Q was a regular matrix, with fixed row and
column weight m. We generalize it by defining Q as a sparse
irregular matrix with average row and column weight m. As
we will see in the following, Q affects the weight of the error
vectors. In order to maintain its effect uniform, independently
of the error vector, we impose that the row and column weights
of Q have minimal dispersion around their mean, that is,
they differ from m by less than 1. This allows choosing
rational values for m, which gives a further degree of freedom
for improving the system efficiency. Moreover, in order to
preserve the QC structure for the public matrices, the matrix Q
must be QC as well, that is, formed by n0×n0 circulant sub-
matrices, each with size p×p. This choice limits the resolution
on the value of m, which cannot vary by less than 1/n20, but it
is sufficient to ensure enough granularity in this context. For
preserving the QC form of the public keys, also S must be
QC, that is, formed by k0×k0 circulant blocks with size p×p.
The public key is obtained as G′ = S−1 ·G ·Q−1; hence,
its size depends on the representation of G′. The QC nature of
the codes and of the scrambling and transformation matrices
allows to achieve a very compact representation, since each
circulant block is simply described by its first row. In addition,
using a CCA2 secure conversion of the system [2] allows
adopting public matrices in systematic form; hence, the public
key size becomes k0 ·(n0−k0)·p = (n0−1)·p bits. This gives
an important improvement with respect to Goppa code-based
instances.
Similarly to the original McEliece cryptosystem, encryption
is performed according to the following steps:
i) Alice gets Bob’s public key G′.
ii) She divides her message into k-bit vectors.
iii) For each k-bit vector u, she generates a random inten-
tional error vector e with weight t′.
iv) She encrypts u into x as follows:
x = u ·G′ + e. (2)
Decryption is performed as follows:
i) Bob inverts the secret transformation:
x′ = x ·Q = u · S−1 ·G+ e ·Q (3)
and obtains a codeword of the secret LDPC code af-
fected by the error vector e ·Q, with weight ≤ t = t′m.
ii) He corrects all the errors through LDPC decoding and
obtains u · S−1.
iii) He recovers u through multiplication by S.
The main difference with respect to the original McEliece
cryptosystem is in the matrix Q, which was a permutation
matrix in the original system, while now it has average row
and column weight m > 1. This causes propagation of
the intentional errors during decryption, and their number is
increased at most by a factor m. Hence, the secret QC-LDPC
code must be able to correct up to t = t′m errors, rather than
t′. On the other hand, this allows protecting the private key
from attacks aimed at exploiting its sparsity, as we will briefly
recall in the following.
Moreover, the sparse parity-check matrix of the secret code
(H) is mapped into a new matrix for the public code:
H′ = H ·QT (4)
(superscript T denotes the transpose) and, though a suitable
choice of m, the density of H′ can be made high enough to
avoid attacks to the dual code (see Section V).
III. IRREGULAR QC-LDPC CODES PERFORMANCE
It is known that irregular LDPC codes are able to achieve
better performance than regular ones [16]. Looking at the
code Tanner graph, an irregular code is defined through its
variable and check nodes degree distributions. According to
the notation in [16], an irregular Tanner graph with max-
imum variable node degree dv and maximum check node
degree dc is described through two sequences, (λ1, . . . , λdv )
and (ρ1, . . . , ρdc), such that λi (ρi) is the fraction of edges
connected to variable (check) nodes with degree i. These
sequences can be used as the coefficients of two polynomials,
λ(x) and ρ(x), describing the edge degree distributions:
{
λ (x) =
∑dv
i=1 λix
i−1,
ρ (x) =
∑dc
i=1 ρix
i−1.
(5)
λ(x) and ρ(x) describe the code degree distributions from
the edge perspective. Alternatively, the same distributions can
be described from the node perspective, through two other
polynomials, v(x) and c(x). Their coefficients, noted by vi
and ci, are computed as the fractions of variable and check
nodes with degree i. λ(x) and ρ(x) can be translated into v(x)
and c(x) as follows [18]:

vi =
λi/i∑
dv
j=1
λj/j
,
ci =
ρi/i∑
dc
j=1
ρj/j
.
(6)
According to our choices, all check nodes have the same
degree dc, whereas, because of (1) and the assumption of a
(possible) different column weight for each circulant block,
a fraction 1/n0 of the variable nodes has degree d(i)v , i =
0, . . . , n0−1. This yields the following simple forms for v(x)
and c(x), that will be used in the following:{
v(x) =
∑n0−1
i=0
xd
(i)
v −1
n0
,
c(x) = xdc−1.
(7)
We note that these polynomials do not correspond to optimized
degree distributions, due to the constraints imposed by the
very special form (1) for H. In addition, the minimum value
of d(i)v , i = 0, 1, . . . , n0 − 1, is lower bounded for security
reasons. In fact, each circulant block Hi, i = 0, 1, . . . , n0− 1,
can be chosen in
( p
d
(i)
v
)
different ways, and we do not want this
number to decrease enough to allow an attacker to enumerate
them. However, despite being forced to obey such constraints,
these irregular codes achieve significant error rate performance
improvements with respect to the regular codes considered up
to now.
To confirm this fact, we have focused on a fixed set of
code parameters and simulated the performance achievable by
regular and irregular QC-LDPC codes. We have considered
n0 = 4, p = 4096, dv = 13, and designed four QC-LDPC
codes through random difference families (RDF) [14]. One of
them is regular, with d(i)v = 13, i = 0, . . . , 3, whereas the
other three are irregular, with:
• d
(0)
v = 11, d
(1)
v = 12, d
(2)
v = 14, d
(3)
v = 15,
• d
(0)
v = 9, d
(1)
v = 11, d
(2)
v = 15, d
(3)
v = 17,
• d
(0)
v = 8, d
(1)
v = 11, d
(2)
v = 15, d
(3)
v = 18.
Their decoding has been performed through the logarithmic
version of the iterative soft-decision sum product algorithm
(SPA) [19]. Performance of the SPA is affected by quantization
issues [20], hence we have used full precision floating point
operations in our simulations. Fig. 1 reports the residual bit
error rate (BER) and codeword error rate (CER) after decoding
for the considered codes. As expected, we observe that the
irregular codes outperform the regular code with the same
parameters, and increasing the code irregularity gives a larger
gain.
IV. DECODING THRESHOLD
Despite numerical simulations provide a precise and prac-
tical assessment of the error correcting performance of LDPC
codes, running them for each possible choice of the code
parameters and the node degree distributions is extremely
time consuming. On the other hand, no theoretical tools exist
for predicting the correction capability of finite length LDPC
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Fig. 1. Simulated SPA decoding performance (BER and CER) for RDF-
based regular and irregular QC-LDPC codes with n0 = 4, p = 4096 and
dv = 13.
codes through closed form expressions. However, in applica-
tions which do not allow the availability of soft information
from the channel, like the one here considered, a good estimate
of the correction capability can be obtained by computing
the convergence threshold of the bit flipping (BF) decoding
algorithm.
Hence, as done in [4], we resort to the BF decoding
threshold by extending its computation to the case in which
the codes are irregular. The main difference with respect to the
case of regular codes is in the fact that the decision threshold b
is no longer unique for all variable nodes, but varies with their
degree. So, for the considered codes, up to n0 different deci-
sion thresholds are used: b(i) ≤ d(i)v − 1, i = 0, 1, . . . , n0 − 1.
As regards other aspects, the algorithm works in the same
way as for regular codes [4]. The choice of the values b(i)
is very important. In the original Gallager’s work [21], two
algorithms were proposed: in the so-called Algorithm A, the
decision thresholds are fixed to b(i) = d(i)v − 1, while in
the so-called Algorithm B they can vary between
⌈
d
(i)
v /2
⌉
and d(i)v − 1 during decoding (⌈·⌉ is the ceiling function).
While Algorithm A is simpler to implement, Algorithm B is
able to achieve better performance. Both algorithms implement
an iterative decision process: i) each check node sends each
neighboring variable node the binary sum of all its other
neighboring variable nodes and ii) each variable node sends
each neighboring check node its initial value, flipped or not,
based on the count of unsatisfied parity-check sums coming
from the other check nodes, and its comparison with the
decision threshold.
The advantage of using BF decoding in this context is that
its decoding threshold can be estimated through theoretical
arguments very similar to those developed in [16], that ex-
tended the original Gallager’s probability recursion [21] to
the case of irregular graphs. However, unlike [16], where a
binary symmetric channel was considered, the current scenario
is equivalent to a channel able to introduce a fixed number of
errors in each transmitted vector. For the QC-LDPC codes
introduced in Section II, the probability that, in an iteration,
the message originating from a variable node is correct can be
expressed as:
f b (j, ql) =
d(j)v −1∑
z=b(j)
(
d
(j)
v − 1
z
)[
pic (ql)
]z[
pii (ql)
]d(j)v −1−z,
(8)
while the probability that, in an iteration, a bit that is not in
error is incorrectly evaluated is:
gb (j, ql) =
d(j)v −1∑
z=b(j)
(
d
(j)
v − 1
z
)[
pci (ql)
]z
[pcc (ql)]
d(j)v −1−z.
(9)
In (8) and (9), as in [4], we have:

pcc (ql) =
∑min{dc−1,ql}
j=0
j even
(dc−1j )(
n−dc
ql−j
)
(n−1ql )
pci (ql) =
∑min{dc−1,ql}
j=0
j odd
(dc−1j )(
n−dc
ql−j
)
(n−1ql )
pic (ql) =
∑min{dc−1,ql}
j=0
j even
(dc−1j )(
n−dc
ql−1−j
)
(n−1ql−1)
pii (ql) =
∑min{dc−1,ql}
j=0
j odd
(dc−1j )(
n−dc
ql−1−j
)
(n−1ql−1)
, (10)
where ql is the average number of residual errors after the lth
iteration. In the considered system, it is q0 ≤ t = t′m, but we
fix q0 = t = t′m to have a worst-case evaluation.
Based on these expressions, and considering the ideal
assumption of a cycle-free Tanner graph, we can obtain an
approximation of the number of errors in the decoded word
after the lth iteration. In using this method, we do not take
into account the distribution of the errors with regard to the
circulant blocks weight, that is, we consider the errors equally
distributed in sets having the same cardinality for each block.
However, we have numerically verified that this approximation
is largely acceptable in the considered context. Based on these
arguments, we can find ql as a function of ql−1:
ql = t−
n0−1∑
j=0
λj
[
t · f b (j, ql−1)− (n− t) · g
b (j, ql−1)
]
.
(11)
Equation (11) permits us to implement a recursive procedure
which allows computing a waterfall threshold by finding the
maximum value t = tth such that lim
l→∞
(ql) = 0.
Since different values of tth can be found by different
choices of the set of b(j), we can search the maximum tth for
each combination of b(j) ∈
{⌈
d
(j)
v /2
⌉
, . . . , d
(j)
v − 1
}
, with
j = 0, 1, . . . , n0 − 1. We will always refer to the optimal
choice of the b(j) values in the following.
We have used this method to compute the decoding thresh-
old for LDPC codes with several lengths, n0 = 4, dv = 13
or 15 and two irregular node degree profiles for each value of
dv (remind that, for irregular codes, dv represents the average
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Fig. 2. BF decoding threshold as a function of the code length for n0 = 4
and several parity-check matrix column weights (dv).
column weight). The results obtained are reported in Fig. 2,
where they are also compared with the threshold values for
regular codes with constant dv = 13 or 15. These results
have been obtained by considering a fixed and optimized set
of decision thresholds for the BF decoder (that is, they do
not change during iterations). As we observe from the figure,
irregular codes allow to improve the error correction capability,
coherent with the conclusion already drawn in Section III with
SPA decoding. It must be said that, if we consider a number of
errors equal to the BF decoding threshold, which is computed
under the hypothesis of absence of local cycles, a finite-length
code with local cycles in its Tanner graphs does not always
achieve a very low error rate under BF decoding. However,
several improved versions of the BF algorithm can be used,
which achieve very low residual error rates when the number
of errors equals, or even overcomes, the BF threshold [4].
Hence, we can consider the BF decoding threshold as a reliable
estimate of the correction capability of the codes we consider
in this context.
V. SECURITY LEVEL
Two attack procedures mostly endanger the LDPC-code
based McEliece cryptosystem, namely: dual code attacks
(DCA) and information set decoding attacks (ISDA) [4]. So,
their work factor (WF) gives the system security level.
The target of DCA is to recover an equivalent private key
from the public key. This can be achieved by searching for the
rows of the parity-check matrix of the public code, H′, and
then exploiting the possible sparsity of H′ to recover H or to
directly perform LDPC decoding and correct the intentional
errors. Searching for the rows of H′ is equivalent to searching
for low weight codewords in the dual of the public code. The
matrix H′ has average column weight d′v = m · dv and row
weight d′c = n0 ·d′v . Hence, d′v is chosen high enough to make
such search practically unfeasible.
The purpose of ISDA is instead to find the error vector
e affecting the ciphertext. This can be accomplished through
algorithms for finding low-weight codewords, which is equiv-
alent to decode a random linear block code. The QC nature of
the codes facilitates this task, since each block-wise cyclically
shifted version of a ciphertext is still a valid ciphertext. Hence,
the attacker can consider block-wise shifted versions of an
intercepted ciphertext, and search for one among as many
shifted versions of the error vector.
Hence, both DCA and ISDA can be mounted by exploiting
efficient algorithms to search for low weight codewords in
random linear block codes, and their WF can be estimated
by computing the minimum complexity of these algorithms.
For this purpose, we consider the approach proposed in [22].
Actually, some advances have recently appeared in the litera-
ture [23], [24] that, however, are more focused on asymptotic
evaluations rather than on reducing the complexity on finite
length codes. Another recent proposal in this context is “ball
collision decoding” [25]. It achieves important WF reductions
asymptotically, but the improvement is negligible for the code
lengths and security levels here of interest.
We have computed the WF of DCA and ISDA, and the
results obtained are summarized in Fig. 3. In the figure, the
abscissa reports d′v for the DCA WF, and t′ for the ISDA
WF. For both attacks, the dependence of the WF on the code
length is weak, and no considerable difference is achieved by
only increasing the code length. Hence, we have plotted the
WF for the shortest code length here considered, that is, n =
16384. Using larger codes yields some increase in the WF,
which makes the value obtained from the figure a pessimistic
estimate, but without any significant deviation.
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Based on the previous analysis, for a given security level and
H column weight distribution, the following simple procedure
allows designing the system parameters:
i) the values of d′v and t′ needed for achieving the desired
security level are obtained from Fig. 3;
ii) the value of m is computed as d′v/dv;
iii) the number of intentional errors to correct is computed
as t = ⌈m · t′⌉;
iv) the code length is found from Fig. 2, such that the
corresponding BF threshold overcomes t.
We notice that using an irregular matrix Q avoids the need
to increase m up to ⌈m⌉, thus keeping the error propagation
effect of Q as small as possible. This increases the efficiency
of the system, since t and, hence, the code length are kept
to their minimum. We remind, however, that m must be a
multiple of 1/n20, hence we must approximate it to the smallest
multiple of 1/n20 greater than or equal to d′v/dv.
VI. DESIGN EXAMPLES
Let us suppose to need 100-bit security. From Fig. 3 we
obtain d′v = 59 and t′ = 47. If we focus on dv = 13 for
the private code, it results m = 4.5625 (approximated to a
multiple of 1/n20 = 1/16). Then, t = ⌈m · t′⌉ = 215. From
Fig. 2 we find that a regular code with dv = 13 and n =
20480, p = 5120 has a BF threshold equal to 225; hence, it
is able to correct all intentional errors. This yields a key size
of 15360 bits. By looking at the irregular code with dv = 13
and degree profile {8, 11, 15, 18}, we obtain that the same BF
decoding threshold is achieved for n = 17524, p = 4381, and
the key size becomes 13143 bits, which is a 15% reduction
with respect to the regular code.
If we want to achieve 160-bit security, we obtain from
Fig. 3 that d′v = 97 and t′ = 79 are needed. By still
considering dv = 13, we obtain m = 7.4375 (with the
same approximation as before). It follows that t = 588.
From Fig. 2, we see that a regular code with dv = 13 and
n = 54616, p = 13654 has a BF threshold equal to 600, which
is enough to correct all intentional errors. The corresponding
key size is 40962 bits. If we use an irregular code with
degree profile {8, 11, 15, 18}, the same BF decoding threshold
is achieved for n = 46448, p = 11622, that is, a key size of
34866 bits. Hence, using an irregular code results in a public
key size reduction of about 15% also in this case.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have studied the use of irregular codes in the McEliece
cryptosystem based on LDPC codes. We have considered
QC-LDPC codes with irregular degree profiles, and verified,
through numerical simulations and theoretical tools, that they
achieve better error correction performance than regular codes
also in this context. This reflects into a more efficient cryp-
tosystem, with a public key size reduction in the order of 15%
with respect to the version using regular codes.
Future work will concern the evaluation of the implemen-
tation cost for the proposed solutions [26].
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